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1 Introduction
Data for the USA show that industrial R&D funding has increased sharply in the 1980s and
1990s (see gure 1). In 2004, R&D expenditures of the business sector amounted to 183.9 billion
dollars compared to just 52.7 billion in 1979. While the ratio of industrial R&D expenditures to
GDP remained fairly constant throughout the 1960s and 1970s, it has risen from at about one
per cent in 1979 to 1.43 per cent in 1990 and 1.72 per cent in 2004 (down from 1.90 in 2000).1
On the contrary, R&D funded by the federal government has grown much more slowly over the
same time horizon and even declined when measured as a ratio of GDP. Paralleling the rise in
industrial R&D spendings, the US (and other industrialised countries) experienced a breakdown
in the relative demand for unskilled workers.2
Against this background, the purpose of the present paper is twofold. First, to provide an
analysis of the eects of lower trading barriers on the incentives of rms to undertake R&D
investment. Second, to explore the subsequent eect on rms' demand for skilled relative to
unskilled workers. By doing so, the study provides some insights into the question of whether
(i) economic integration might have been a driving force of the large increase in industrial R&D
funding and whether (ii) higher investments in R&D may have contributed to the aforemen-
tioned developments in the labour market.
Towards this aim, a simple model of international oligopoly is set up. Firms operate in seg-
mented markets and can invest in both process and product innovation. Process innovation
allows rms to produce at lower marginal production costs. Product innovation is understood
as a means of reducing the substitutability between goods. Therefore, the focus lies on inno-
vation within a given product life-cycle (rather than on the invention of new products). Firms
hire skilled workers for performing R&D while production requires solely unskilled workers.3
Economic integration is then modelled as a reduction in trading costs between segmented mar-
1Figures are provided by the National Science Foundation and total expenditures are measured in constant
2000 dollars. R&D data for 2004 are projections.
2For a recent paper that reviews the ongoing academic debate in this area and provides detailed empirical
evidence on trends in U.S. wage inequality see Autor et al. (2005).
3One could also assume that R&D is relatively more skill-intensive than production. The extreme assumption
of skilled and unskilled workers being the only inputs in R&D and production, respectively, just simplies the
model.
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kets. Competitive pressures increase and induce rms to invest more in lower marginal produc-
tion costs and a greater degree of product dierentiation. In fact, investing in one type of R&D
also provides additional incentives to invest in the other. Thus, process and product innova-
tions are found to be complementary. Higher investments in R&D raise relative skill demand
both directly through higher demand for skilled workers and indirectly through a reduction in
the requirements of unskilled workers per unit of production. For conventional functional form
assumptions these eects will outweigh the positive eect on the demand for unskilled workers
resulting from an increase in total output following trade liberalisation.
There exists a small theoretical literature that focuses on both process and product innovation
at the same time. Lin and Saggi (2002) investigate the relationship between process and product
R&D in a three stage model. Before production takes place, rms decide rst on product R&D
and then on the level of process R&D. In contrast, Rosenkranz (2003) analyses the strategic
decision of oligopolists that simultaneously choose product and process innovation. Weiss (2003)
examines the eect of changes in the degree of competition on rms' decision to engage in either
process or product R&D. However, neither the issue of economic integration nor any labour
market eects are considered in these studies. Instead of focusing on a single market the present
work analyses the eects of a change in the competitive environment on (the interplay of) the
two types of innovation in an international oligopoly.
The paper at hand is closer related to studies by Neary (2002) and Haaland and Kind (2004).
Neary (2002) demonstrates that a reduction in import barriers will induce rms to increase their
strategic investment as to blockade entry of foreign competitors. Assuming investment to be
skilled-labour intensive (relative to production), trade liberalisation increases the wage premium
of skilled workers as well as skill-intensity. Haaland and Kind (2004) analyse the interaction
between trading costs, process innovation and R&D subsidies. Among other things their study
illustrates that trade liberalisation may increase private and social incentives to invest in cost-
saving R&D.
The present paper shares some similarities with these two studies but crucial dierences exist.
While Neary (2002) studies the threat of import competition into the home market, the focus
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of this study is on the decision process of a rm that simultaneously serves the home and the
foreign market, and on situations, in which intra-industry trade actually occurs. The model
abstracts from the strategic value of investment and shows that trade liberalisation increases
the eciency of R&D investments. Haaland and Kind (2004), on the other hand, do not con-
sider labour market eects of the interaction between trading costs and R&D investments. More
importantly, neither Neary (2002) nor Haaland and Kind (2004) deal with product innovation
but concentrate on process innovation. Given the fact that in the USA product R&D appears
to be quantitatively more important than process R&D,4 extending the analysis to incorporate
both types of R&D seems to be of great importance.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. The inter-
action between trade liberalisation and the incentives of rms to invest in process and product
innovation is analysed in section 3. Section 4 then studies the subsequent eects on the relative
skill demand of rms. Finally, section 5 oers some concluding remarks and briey describes
how the setting could be implemented into a general equilibrium framework.
2 The Basic Model
There are two identical countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F), and two rms. Firm 1 is located
in Home, while rm 2 is located in Foreign. Given the symmetry of the model, we shall only
present equations for Home. Analogous equations exist for Foreign as well.
Each of the two rms produces a dierentiated good. The utility of the representative consumer
is a function of the two goods and the numeraire good m and is given by
U (e; q1H ; q2H ;m) = a (q1H + q2H) 
1
2
 
q21H + q
2
2H + 2eq1Hq2H

+m; (1)
where e 2 [0; 1] is an inverse measure of product dierentiation and q1H and q2H denote con-
sumption of the good produced by rm 1 and 2, respectively. Utility maximisation then gives
4Scherer and Ross (1990) suggest that at about three-forth of R&D investment by rms in the USA are devoted
to product innovation.
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rise to the following linear inverse demand functions
p1H (e; q1H ; q2H) = a  (q1H + eq2H) ; (2)
p2H (e; q1H ; q2H) = a  (eq1H + q2H) ; (3)
where piH is the price of rm i's good in Home.
On the supply side, the two rms are assumed to compete as Cournot duopolists in segmented
markets. Firms incur symmetric trading costs of t per unit of exports. Trading costs are
exogenously given and reect a wide range of costs, including, for instance, transportation
expenditures, taris or costs of border formalities.
In order to produce one unit of its respective good, rm i has to employ (ki) 2 [0; a] units of
unskilled labour. Unit costs of production are then given by (ki)w with w being the (exogenous)
wage rate of the unskilled.5 By increasing the investment in process R&D, denoted by ki, rms
can lower their unit requirements in unskilled labour. It is assumed that 0 < 0, 00  0.
Moreover, the competitors determine the extent of product dierentiation, e(d1; d2) with
@e
@di
< 0
and @
2e
@2di
 0 , through investment in product innovation di. Note that product R&D shifts
outward not only the demand function of the innovating rm but also the one of its competitor.
The costs of R&D investment are incurred in terms of wages for skilled workers. In order to
undertake process and product R&D investment, rms have to hire Sk(ki) and S
d(di) skilled
workers, respectively, with Sk 0 > 0, Sd0 > 0 and Sk 00 > 0, Sd00 > 0. To obtain interior solutions,
it is further imposed that Sk(0) = 0, Sd(0) = 0, and limki!ki S
k(ki) = 1 (with (k

i ) = 0),
limdi!di S
d(di) = 1 (with e(d

1; d

2) = 0). Skilled workers are paid an exogenous wage rate r.
The prot of the rm located in Home is then given by
1 = p1H (e; q1H ; q2H) q1H + (p1F (e; q1F ; q2F )  t)q1F   (q1H + q1F )(k1)w
 (Sk(k1) + S
d(d1))r; (4)
5Section 5 briey describes how the setting could be implemented into a general equilibrium framework with
endogenous factor prices.
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where the subscript F is used to mark variables referring to Foreign. Firms maximise prots by
choosing simultaneously output in the two markets as well as their investments in process and
product innovation.6
3 Trade Liberalisation and R&D Investment
The optimal levels of process and product R&D are considered rst. Taking the rst derivative
of prots with respect to the investment in process innovation yields
@Sk(k1)
@k1
r =  
@(k1)
@k1
(q1H + q1F )w: (5)
Marginal costs equal the incremental increase in wages paid to skilled workers, while benets
are given in terms of the marginal reduction in production costs. The rst order condition for
the optimal level of product innovation reads
@Sd(d1)
@d1
r =  
@e(d1; d2)
@d1
(q2Hq1H + q2F q1F ): (6)
Again, marginal costs of investing in process innovation equal the marginal increase in the
employment of skilled workers times the wage rate. Marginal benets are given by the resulting
increase in product prices in the two markets multiplied by the respective output level.
6In an alternative setup, investment decisions might be made before production takes places. Then rms also
face strategic motives to undertake R&D investment. However, this would not change the results of the paper.
The strategic motives for R&D investment are also well understood and discussed in, for instance, Lin and Saggi
(2002), Neary (2002) and Rosenkranz (2003).
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Holding R&D investments xed, one can further derive the optimal output decisions as
q1H =
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
1
2(a  (k1)w) for
2
4 e2
(e(k2)w   2(k1)w   2t)
+ 22+ea  0
1
4 e2
[(2  e)a+ et  2(k1)w + e(k2)w] otherwise
(7)
q1F =
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
0 for 2
4 e2
(e(k2)w   2(k1)w   2t)
+ 22+ea  0
1
4 e2
[(2  e)a  2t  2(k1)w + e(k2)w] otherwise
(8)
In the (symmetric) Cournot equilibrium, it further holds that q1H = q2F , q1F = q2H as well as
d1 = d2 = d, k1 = k2 = k. Equations (5) - (8) can now be used to analyse the link between trade
liberalisation, i.e. a decrease in trading costs t, and rm's investment in product and process
innovation.
Consider rst the case, in which trade barriers will prevent rms from exporting. The com-
petitors act as unconstrained monopolists in their national markets. While the monopolists
will invest in process innovation to reap the benets of reducing costs of their production for
the national market, they refrain from investing in product innovation.7 The reason is simply
that a monopolist does not prot from dierentiating its product from the one of a non-existing
competitor. Marginal decreases in trading barriers will not alter the equilibrium outcome as
long as exports are not protable. Hereafter, attention is restricted to the more interesting case
of positive levels of intra-industry trade.8
Equations (7) and (8) show that with positive exports trade liberalisation has two compet-
ing eects on rm's optimal output level for any given level of R&D investment. On the one
hand, protection of the domestic market and, hence, domestic sales decline. On the other
hand, reducing trading barriers will increase exports. It is easily veried that due to the in-
crease in competitive pressures in both markets the positive eect on output has to prevail (i.e.
@(q1H + q1F )=@t < 0). This, in turn, will aect the incentives of rms to undertake R&D in-
7Formally, this can seen from equation (6) and the fact that q1F = q2H = 0.
8A sucient but not necessary condition for positive levels of intra-industry trade is a  (0)w > 2t.
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vestments.
First, a higher level of total output increases the benets of reducing marginal production costs
thereby inducing additional investment in process R&D.9 Second, the pro-competitive eect of
trade liberalisation also provides additional incentives to invest in product innovations. In the
domestic market, intensifying foreign competition makes product dierentiation more valuable
since it now has a stronger impact on market prices. This eect dominates the negative impact
of reduced domestic output. In the export market, the ability to charge higher prices (for a given
level of output) pays o more with low levels of trading costs because of the rise in production
for the foreign market. The eect exceeds the negative one resulting from lower output of the
domestic rm (leading to lower benets in terms of the impact product dierentiation has on
the market price).
Formally, the positive eect of trade liberalisation on product innovation can be shown by dier-
entiating the marginal benet of product R&D with respect to t and combine it with q1H = q2F ,
q1F = q2H and equations (7) and (8) to nd
@

 
@e(d1;d2)
@d1
(q2Hq1H + q2F q1F )

@t
=  2
@e(d1; d2)
@d1

@q1H
@t
q1F +
@q1F
@t
q1H

=  2
@e(d1; d2)
@d1

e
4  e2
q1F  
2
4  e2
q1H

< 0; (9)
which has to hold given @e
@di
< 0, 2 > e and q1H > q1F .
Now consider the subsequent eect of increasing the investment in (process and product) R&D.
Not surprisingly, lower marginal production cost will induce rms to raise the output for both
markets. With k1 = k2 = k the derivatives of output with respect to the investment in product
R&D are given by
@q1H
@k
=
@q1F
@k
=  
1
4  e2
(2  e)
@(k)
@k
w > 0: (10)
Thus, process innovation will expand output levels. Equations (5) and (6) show that this will lead
to further investments in process and product R&D (remember that q1H = q2F and q1F = q2H in
equilibrium). In particular, note that higher equilibrium levels of k provide additional incentives
9This eect has also been found by Haaland and Kind (2004).
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for a rm to invest in product R&D for two reasons. First, the production of the competitor
increases and, hence, product dierentiation yields higher marginal benets in terms of the
positive eect on market prices. Second, the rm's own output increases and the higher market
prices apply to a higher level of production.
A similar result can be established for investment in product R&D. Higher degrees of product
dierentiation (e < 0) extend market size10 and increase total production. With k1 = k2 = k
one obtains
@(q1H + q1F )
@e
=  
1
(2 + e)2
[2a  t  2(k)w] < 0: (11)
Hence, product innovation leads to higher output levels and provides further incentives for
process innovation. The subsequent eect on product R&D depends on the product rather than
the sum of the two output levels and is less obvious. While a higher degree of product dieren-
tiation unambiguously raises exports, the marginal eect on domestic output is undetermined
and depends on the level of trading barriers. Taking the rst derivatives of equations (7) and
(8) with respect to e (and imposing k1 = k2 = k) yields
@q1H
@e
=  
a  (k)w
(2 + e)2
+
(4 + e2)t
(4  e2)2
; (12)
@q1F
@e
=  
a  (k)w
(2 + e)2
 
4et
(4  e2)2
< 0: (13)
Inserting the upper and lower bounds of t for positive trading volumes (as given by (1 1=2e)(a 
(k)w) and 0) into equation (12) shows that the derivative might take either sign.11 For large
levels of trading costs, the domestic rm gains little from product dierentiation in the domestic
market. Export volumes are low and a decreasing e leads to relatively small gains in terms of
higher market prices. On contrary, the exporter can charge considerably higher prices following
a reduction in e and therefore expand exports signicantly. Since output levels are strategic
substitutes, the domestic rm responds by cutting output levels. For high levels of protection
the latter eect might well outweigh the positive eect and domestic output shrinks.
10Note that demand for a given price level is increasing in the degree of product dierentiation.
11Substituting in the upper limit for t reveals that the resulting expression is positive for 2e  1=2e3 > 0. This
condition is fullled in the relevant range of 0 < e < 1.
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However, it can be shown that even if product innovation led to decreasing levels of domestic
output, the positive eect on exports would be large enough to increase the marginal benets
of product R&D even further. A formal proof of this nding is provided in the appendix A.2.
The main results of this section are summarised in
Proposition 1. For positive levels of intra-industry trade lower trading barriers (lower values
of t) will increase total output and the investment of rms in both process and product R&D.
Higher investment in process and product innovations will translate into further changes in
output, which induce rms to invest even more in both types of R&D. Thus, process and product
R&D are found to be complementary.
4 Trade Liberalisation and Relative Labour Demand
After having analysed the eects of trade liberalisation on the choice of output levels and R&D
investments, the subsequent impact on relative labour demand is examined now. Demand for
skilled workers S is the sum of workers required for the chosen level of process and product R&D,
respectively. Demand for unskilled workers U is given by total output multiplied by (ki), the
requirement of unskilled workers per unit of production. Relative labour demand of rm 1 can
therefore be written as 
S
U
Demand
=
Sk(k1) + S
d(d1)
(q1H + q1F )(k1)
: (14)
Dierentiating with respect to t gives the eects of marginal changes in trading costs on relative
skill demand
@
 
S
U
Demand
@t
=

@Sk(k1)
@t
+ @S
d(d1)
@t

(q1H + q1F )(k1)
[(q1H + q1F )(k1)]2
 
@(k1)
@t
(Sk(k1) + S
d(d1))(q1H + q1F )
[(q1H + q1F )(k1)]2
 
@(q1H+q1F )
@t
(Sk(k1) + S
d(d1))(k1)
[(q1H + q1F )(k1)]2
: (15)
The analysis of equation (15) leads directly to
Proposition 2. Trade liberalization has three competing eects on relative skill demand. First,
lower trading barriers increase the investment in product and process innovation, which translates
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into higher demand for skilled workers. Second, investment in process innovation reduces the per
unit requirements of unskilled labour in production. Hence, for any given level of output demand
for the unskilled declines. The third eect works in the opposite direction. Trade liberalisation
increases output and raises the demand for unskilled workers holding (ki) constant.
Without additional functional form assumptions the sign of equation (15) can not be deter-
mined. In order to learn more about the interaction between trade liberalisation, investment
in R&D, and relative skill demand, specic functional forms are considered now. Following the
relevant literature12 R&D investment is assumed to reduce production costs and to increase
product dierentiation in a linear way. The degree of product dierentiation is then given by
e = 1  (d1+ d2) with di 2 [0; 1=2], while the requirement of unskilled labour per unit of output
is determined as (ki) = c   ki with ki 2 [0; c]. Furthermore, investment costs are assumed to
be quadratic, i.e. Sk(ki) = 1=2k
2
i and S
d(di) = 1=2d
2
i . With these functional form assumptions,
the rst-order conditions for the optimal levels of investment in process and product investment
for rm 1 read
k1r = (q1H + q1F )w; (16)
d1r = q2Hq1H + q2F q1F : (17)
Now, one can solve for R&D investments, which then determine skilled labour demand given the
functional form assumptions. Substituting into equation (14), imposing q1H = q2F , q1F = q2H
and also replacing (k1) by c  k1 yield

S
U
Demand
=
w2
2r2
(q1H + q1F )
2 + 2
r2
(q21Hq
2
1F )
(q1H + q1F )(c  k1)
: (18)
This expression allows to nd an unambiguous eect of trade liberalisation on relative skill
demand. In fact, dierentiating with respect to trading barriers and simple calculus reveal
Proposition 3. With quadratic investment costs and linear eects of R&D investments on
12See for instance, Neary (2002) Haaland and Kind (2004) for process R&D as well as Lin and Saggi (2002) for
process and product R&D.
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production cost and the degree of product dierentiation, lower trading costs will raise skill
demand. In fact, the rst eect identied in proposition 2 (i.e. the direct positive eect on
skilled labour demand) suces to outweigh the third (i.e. the positive eect on the demand for
the unskilled via the rise in output levels).
The proof is relegated to appendix A.3.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has set up a simple model of international oligopoly to study the interaction between
lower trading barriers and the investment of rms in process and product innovation. Increased
competition following trade liberalisation induces rms to bring down production costs by invest-
ing more aggressively in process R&D. At the same time, competitors expand their investments
in product innovation in order to reduce the substitutability of their products. Assuming R&D
to be intensive in skilled-labour (relative to production), the paper further illustrates that trade
liberalisation may increase the relative demand for skilled workers.
In order to study the eects of the interaction between trade liberalisation and R&D investment
on aggregate labour markets more thoroughly, a highly relevant path for further research is the
integration of the model into a general equilibrium framework. A promising way to proceed
could be the development of a General Oligopolistic Equilibrium Model (GOLE) as proposed
by Neary (2003). The key idea of this class of models is to think of rms as being large in
their sectors but small in the economy as a whole. Consumers have additively separable pref-
erences dened over a continuum of goods produced in a continuum of industries. Since rms
are then small in comparison to the economy they take aggregate variables such as factor prices
and aggregate income as given. Hence, the approach avoids the usual problems of modelling
oligopolistic competition in general equilibrium.
Applying the concept to the present paper, one might think of a model with two symmetric
countries. Each country hosts a continuum of sectors. Abstracting from dierences across sec-
tors, industries are identical to the model described in section 2. Trade liberalisation then raises
skill demands in all sectors. On the labour market, the relative supply of skilled to unskilled
12
workers may increase with relative factor prices. Increasing skill demands (following a decline in
trading costs) would translate into higher factor prices and also increase the aggregate relative
supply of skilled labour. These ndings correspond with the empirical observations for the US
labour market.
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A Appendix
A.1 Figures
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Figure 1: Industrial R&D Expenditures, Total and Relative to GDP, USA, 1960-2004 (Source:
National Science Foundation, Data for 2004 are Projections)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. What remains to be shown for the proposition to hold is that increasing the investment
in product R&D will induce output changes, which further increase the incentives for product
innovation. In the symmetric equilibrium, marginal benets of investing in product innovation
are increasing in q1F q1H . Taking the rst derivative with respect to e gives
@(q1F q1H)
@e
= q1F
@q1H
@e
+ q1H
@q1F
@e
; (19)
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which has to be negative for the proposition to hold (remember that e is an inverse measure of
product dierentiation). Substituting equations (12) and (13) into (19) and rearranging gives
the following condition for @(q1F q1H)
@e
< 0
(q1F + q1H)(a  (k)w)
(2 + e)2
+
4q1Het
(4  e2)2

q1F (4 + e
2)t
(4  e2)2
: (20)
Since q1H  q1F for t  0, the condition above will still hold if one replaces q1H by q1F on the
left hand side. Simple calculation then reveals that the condition reduces to
2(a  (k)w)  t: (21)
which has to hold for positive levels of intra-industry trade.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Dierentiating equation (18) with respect to t (and ignoring the common denominator)
shows that the rst eect identied in proposition 2 will outweigh the third if the following
condition holds
w2
r2
(q1H + q1F )

@q1H
@t
+
@q1F
@t

(q1H + q1F )(c  k1) +
4
r2

q1Hq
2
1F
@q1H
@t
+ q21Hq1F
@q1F
@t

(q1H + q1F )(c  k1) 

w2
2r2
(q1H + q1F )
2 +
2
r2
(q21Hq
2
1F )

@q1H
@t
+
@q1F
@t

(c  k1)  0: (22)
Multiply out and rearrange to obtain
('+ 4q1Hq
3
1F )
@q1H
@t
+ ('+ 4q31Hq1F )
@q1F
@t
 0; (23)
with ' = 1=2w2q21H + w
2q1Hq1F + 1=2w
2q21F + 2q
2
1Hq
2
1F > 0. For positive levels of exports the
condition has to be fullled since  @q1F
@t
> @q1H
@t
and q1H  q1F > 0. This proves the second part
of proposition 3. The rst part follows directly from the fact that the remaining second eect
16
will also depress the demand for unskilled workers, i.e. work into the same direction as the rst
one does.
17
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